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NSC Meeting on START

27 March 1984

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Tab A Warning Assessment: USSR/EE (As referenced in your talking points)

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Tab C An Additional HUMINT Report

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DCI Talking Points for Today's NSC on Arms Control

There is agreement in the Intelligence Community that the main Soviet objectives through 1984 are likely to be:

- Avoidance of any move--particularly in INF--that would help the President's reelection prospects.
- But at the same time not to have the USSR appear as completely intransigent.

This postulated Soviet approach is fully examined in the CIA memorandum which you all have and is borne out of the way the Soviets have been talking out of both sides of their mouth in several channels:

- Dobrynin, for instance, has been stressing in various backgrounders to journalists that the USSR is ready for progress.
- But other Soviet officials [REDACTED] say that US-Soviet relations would improve very quickly and lay out the Soviet conditions for resuming the INF and START talks: a moratorium on US deployments and a pledge to take UK and French systems into account in some negotiation.
- Meanwhile, Soviet CW negotiator Israelyan explained [REDACTED] that for the time being the USSR had no intention of revitalizing the INF or START talks as this would help the President.

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The logical conclusion from all this is that the Soviets are signaling that they want the US to pay the price for resuming the talks that the Soviets disrupted.

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- But I don't think we should expect any breakthrough on START and INF.
- The Soviets probably believe that a treaty (and the ratification process) is out of reach this year, and that the appearance of an agreement would help the President politically.

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